Wrestling With "Genuine Tradition" and "Invented Tradition"

In my mind, I do not separate Tradition from concepts like, Authority, Genesis and Authenticity. I actually think that its connection to these terms is what I find predominantly interesting about it—that sense of “knowing” that I can uncover or understand something “real” about “the origin” of a particular religion if I study its Tradition. As I read over and think about what I have just written though, it is difficult for me to ignore why I have felt the need to place the words, “knowing,” “real” and “the origin” in quotation marks. Do you do things like this as well—where you notice something about your writing that makes you question the ideas that lie behind what you have just expressed?

My use of quotation marks is suggestive, isn’t it? I began by saying how I equate Tradition with Authority, Genesis and Authenticity and go on to undermine this link by connecting Tradition to things that are like (but are not) Knowing, Real and the Origin: “knowing,” “real” and “the origin.” What does this say about the extent to which I think these capitalized concepts exist and/or exist in a way that is knowable? What does this say about the extent to which I trust in the power of Tradition to communicate anything about these concepts? Why do I think that Tradition can be trusted? How do I know that its explanations of a particular practice or perspective are valid? I will (and do) go as far as to invest meaning and value in the study of Tradition, but I wonder how much of these personal formulations of meaning and value need to be re-evaluated.

At the heart of these questions is, I think, Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 8). In his “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” Hobsbawm defines the “invention of tradition” in opposition to “genuine tradition” (Hobsbawm 8). He argues that the defining feature of the latter is its antiquity, whereas the former simply appropriates, ritualizes and/or modifies “ancient materials” for some new purpose (Hobsbawm 4, 6). Admittedly, this observation made a lot of sense to me at first because I found it immediately affirming in two respects. The word, “genuine,” locates “Genuine tradition” within the realm of the Original (the ancient), which subsequently establishes a relationship between this kind of tradition and my ideas of “knowing something real” about the “beginning of things.” Using Hobsbawm’s authoritative definition, I can academically “justify” this relationship. Yet, I find that even under the supervision of Hobsbawm’s definition, I do not ultimately have the tools needed to sufficiently escape encapsulating these concepts in quotation marks.

I feel this way in part because I think that there is something superficial about the distinction that Hobsbawm draws between his two types of tradition. He elaborates upon this distinction when he says, “[…] the strength and adaptability of genuine traditions is not to be confused with the ‘invention of tradition’. Where the old ways are alive, traditions need be neither revived nor invented” (Hobsbawm 8). What is he talking about here? In particular, what does he mean by “the old ways,” exactly? Is he actually positing that the “authenticity” of “genuine tradition” rests solely upon its being older or more ancient than “invented tradition”? And as I say this sort of incredulously, do I actually think that I am positing anything different when I assert Tradition’s intrinsic link to Authority, Genesis and Authenticity?

The frustration that I feel over this issue reminds me of how I initially felt about what Bynum says concerning the historian’s task and its “preclud[ing] wholeness” (“In Praise of Fragments”…14). If we can never know everything about the past, then we can ever be sure of what constitutes a “genuine tradition”? Might it not also be possible to categorize the most ancient tradition we know of as an “invention of tradition” if the Beginning and its peoples’ tradition could be accurately pinpointed and described?

As I see it, Paul Post’s article, “The Creation of Tradition,” tries to resolve these questions by exposing their irrelevance to Hobsbawm’s discussion of “invention.” He asserts that in using the term “invented tradition,” Hobsbawm is primarily concerned with “a situation of discontinuity [where] something new is created,” rather than underscoring the superior or inferior quality of some traditions relative to others (Post 46). I think that this argument is compelling in that it does indeed downplay the importance of assigning authenticity to various traditions.

However, does it succeed in rendering this process entirely unnecessary? I don’t think so. Post insufficiently addresses why, if Hobsbawm was not concerned with hierarchically understanding traditions, he “repeatedly make[s] a distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘invented traditions’” (Post 45). Afterall, cannot all traditions be seen as representations of the initial discontinuity of a new creation that Post speaks of (Post 46)? I also wonder whether or not the “misuse” and “fabrication” that defines Hobsbawm’s “invention of history” should (or should not) be discussed more thoroughly with respect the “invention of tradition” and the particular foundation upon which it is built (Post 45-46)? Are these two “inventions” really conceived of all that differently in Hobsbawm’s thought?

I am still uncertain about how to answer these questions, but wanted to end by asking a few that I thought of while reacting to this week’s readings: How do you think Hobsbawm would view Christianity and Judaism in terms of “genuine tradition” and the “invention of tradition”? Do you think that Post would view them in the same way or not even be concerned about placing them within either of these categories? What (if anything) can the answers to these questions tell us about the usefulness of Hobsbawm’s theory and/or the validity of Post’s interpretation of that theory?